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of Theodosius BLAME?
The ruling by the European Court of Human Rights on the crucifix in classrooms which causes problems, rather than legal, go to the depth of the political.
For example when the Court states its understanding of negative freedom, which, according to the judge "is not limited to the absence of religious services od'insegnamento religious. It extends to the practices or symbols expressing, in particular or in general, a belief, religious or atheist. " Until now, the general conception (and prevalent) is that for the protection of "negative liberty" was enough to exclusion of the State (and other subjects) from any interference (in the sense of injury, loss, trampled) in the sphere personal freedom (and subjective), the so-called "legal position" of the city, whose freedom and property is protected by national and (also) by international treaties.
An example of violation of this traditional conception of freedom (and the attacks of the same) gives us the Theodosius, who, after having issued the Edict of Thessalonica (on Christianity as official religion of the Empire) and saw that it was not so much respected, decided a few years later, to punish it with two thick penis. So hit the outside of the cult are charged with bad penalties: death penalty-down, up to heavy fines (fifteen pounds d’oro). Con che cominciava l’imposizione del cristianesimo attraverso la compressione della libertà negativa (in particolare di culto) dei pagani. E da Teodosio in poi è stato in grande prevalenza ritenuto che, per aversi attentato alla libertà “negativa” occorresse – quanto meno – una interferenza nella “sfera giuridica” del destinatario. Cioè un comando , accompagnato da una sanzione tesa a farlo osservare, incidente nella suddetta sfera: se non con pene alla Teodosio, almeno con multe, sequestri, confische (che Teodosio, ai tempi del quale non era stato istituito il CSM né la particolare responsabilità dei giudici, aggravava negligent for judges to enforce the imperial will.)
This was the conception, among others, Isaiah Berlin referred to the negative freedom of the human person is no outside interference, and freedom from coercion others.
To argue the concept of it innovative than the traditional, the Court has been scrambling: why hang a crucifix in a public (not private) does not affect the personal ("private"), or sanctioned in any way, failure to treat - ol'aperta dispute – del simbolo esibito. E per ciò ha scelto quello, particolarmente levigato (e contestabile) della psicologia; onde il crocifisso “ può essere emotivamente perturbante per alunni d’altre religioni o che non professino alcuna religione…”.
Poi la Corte rafforza la propria argomentazione allegando la neutralità dello Stato: “lo Stato è obbligato alla neutralità confessionale dell’educazione pubblica… la Corte non vede come l’esposizione… d’un simbolo che è ragionevole associare al cattolicesimo (perché? Cristo non è morto e risorto per tutti gli uomini, also Protestant and Orthodox?) could serve to educational pluralism, which is essential to the preservation of a "democratic society" as conceived by the Convention. "
However, the traditional conception ( of freedom as absence of interference) does not escape even the European Convention, which art. 9 states "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom to manifest one's religion or belief either individually or collectively, in public or in private, worship, teaching, le pratiche e l’osservanza dei riti.
La libertà di manifestare la propria religione o il proprio credo può essere oggetto di quelle sole restrizioni…” e all’art. 2 del protocollo addizionale n. 1 “Il diritto all’istruzione non può essere rifiutato a nessuno. Lo Stato, nell’esercizio delle funzioni che assume nel campo dell’educazione e dell’insegnamento, deve rispettare il diritto dei genitori di assicurare tale educazione e tale insegnamento secondo le loro convinzioni religiose e filosofiche”; ma anche se è chiaro che, stante la norma, non si potrebbe imporre un’ora di catechismo a uno studente musulmano o buddista, can not understand how the exposure of a symbol can be considered detrimental to the negative freedom (which requires to be violated coercion or interference).
also because in the case, since the space "the public" has been extended to this character (and limit) the defense of privacy, to be inherent to negative liberty, with the connotation that changing some of its own: the defense what is my the determination of what is not my but all (public). And for which there is more than doubtful - indeed the second Italian law in force, excluded - we can speak of individual right, but everything to grant legitimate interest (if not simple interest).
There is another issue that puts the Court, which is closely related to the first. Repeatedly the Court held that such "restrictions are incompatible with the duty of the State to respect the neutrality in the exercise of public negative right ... this deserves special protection if the State is expressing a faith ... The duty of neutrality and impartiality state is incompatible with any power of appreciation by this concerning the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the forms of expression of those "... For the Court, these considerations lead to the obligation for the State of refrain from, directly or indirectly, beliefs, places where people depend from it, or in places where they are particularly vulnerable.
Likewise, these allegations raise questions, if in fact the neutrality of the state is not attributable either to an interference of privacy, nor the denial of a benefit payable to all (such as education, provided for in Article . 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention) but the display of a symbol the concept of "internal neutrality", with clear distinctions analyzed by Schmitt and assume other, unforeseen and unforeseeable. While it is configured in accordance with art. Protocol 2 of a form of "neutrality in the sense of equality, that is identical inclusion of all groups ... to the enjoyment of benefits or other state services," so it may be legitimate claim to Islamic scholars, Orthodox and Jewish teaching, hour special, the doctrine of religious affiliation, does not appear to be claiming to remove the symbols of the beliefs or affiliations of others. Symbols that, in the political, have a great importance: for example the flag, whose shape and color is required by Article. 12 of the Italian Constitution in force, and recalls the unity achieved in the Italian Risorgimento. And the nostalgia of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Papal State does not consider an improvement: no reason that either the Republic has the right to persecute or beliefs that have the same flag to a "neutral".
More generally if Smend as he wrote, the state is a reality only in the sense of achievement "(in which the symbolism has an important role of integration, as" representation a particularly effective and flexible content value "), the identification of citizens in a set of values \u200b\u200b(and wishes) is one of the essential integration (into the" production dynamics ") of political unity. Remove those symbols from public life - at least - an integral value, it means weakening the political unity which is not (if not in part) can be expressed in terms of legal and static (such as constitutional patriotism reduced to of documentary fetishism written constitution), but it is a process of building dynamic and politically practical, what Renan, referring to nazione, chiamava “il plebiscito di tutti i giorni”.
Ma se bandiamo i simboli identitari della civiltà che è il prius (e il genus ) di quella attuale, e alla quale dobbiamo proprio la separazione tra temporale e spirituale (“rendete a Dio ciò che è di Dio, a Cesare ciò che è di Cesare”), il risultato è l’indebolimento e la dissoluzione degli Stati in altrettanti condomini abitati da apolidi/agnostici, indifferenti a qualsiasi stimolo che non quello dell’interesse personale. Il che è molto peggio di quello che appare da questa sentenza che, in se, apparentemente, è un progresso nella scristianizzazione, mentre è gravida di altre, più estese, conseguenze.
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